Michael Simko v. United States Steel Corp by unknown
2021 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-29-2021 
Michael Simko v. United States Steel Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021 
Recommended Citation 
"Michael Simko v. United States Steel Corp" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 304. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/304 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 







UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 












UNITED STATES STEEL CORP 
_____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No.:  2:19-cv-00765) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
_____________________________________ 
 
Argued September 24, 2020 
 
(Filed March 29, 2021) 
 
Before:  McKEE, JORDAN and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
John E. Egers, Jr. (Argued) 
Julian Law Firm 
71 North Main Street 
Washington, PA 15301 
 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Gail S. Coleman (Argued) 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
131 M. St., N.E.  





Counsel for Amicus Appellant  
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
 
Rodney M. Torbic (Argued) 
United States Steel Corp 
600 Grant Street, Suite 1515 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 




O P I N I O N 
_________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
In this employment discrimination case, Michael Simko 
asserts one claim of retaliation against his former employer, 
United States Steel Corp., under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.  Simko 
alleges that in August 2014 he was discharged in retaliation for 
filing an administrative charge of disability discrimination with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 
approximately fifteen months earlier.  Simko’s original 
charge—which alleged that U.S. Steel disqualified him for 
another position on the basis of his hearing disability—was 
timely filed.  But he never filed a timely charge of retaliation 
that formed the basis for his complaint before the District 
Court.  The District Court held that the later claim of retaliation 
was not encompassed within the earlier charge, and, therefore, 
that his failure to file a timely retaliation charge was fatal.  
Accordingly, the District Court dismissed his complaint for 





Simko, who suffers from hearing loss, began working 
for U.S. Steel in August 2005.  In August 2012, while he was 
employed as a Larryman in the Blast Furnace Department of 
the U.S. Steel plant in Braddock, Pennsylvania, he successfully 
bid on an open position as Spellman in the Transportation 
Department.  During training for the position, Simko requested 
a new two-way radio from a Transportation Department 
supervisor to accommodate his hearing impairment, but U.S. 
Steel did not provide the new radio or any other 
accommodation.  Although Simko completed the Spellman 
training, he alleges that his trainer refused to approve his 
completion of the training and “sign off” that he was able to 
perform the Spellman duties because of his disability.  App 33.  
Having failed to secure the Spellman position, Simko resumed 
working as a Larryman in the Blast Furnace Department.   
A. Simko’s Original Charge and Initial 
Discharge 
On May 24, 2013, Simko signed an EEOC charge 
alleging violations of the ADA against U.S. Steel.  The only 
box checked on the original charge was for “[d]iscrimination 
based on . . . disability.”  App. 33.  Specifically, Simko asserted 
that U.S. Steel discriminated against him by denying him the 
Spellman position and denying his request for an 
accommodation.  Simko also alleged in the charge that he was 
later “subjected to negative comments from other employees 
regarding my impairment,” including one instance in which the 
“Walking Boss” told him that “[i]f I couldn’t hear, I must be 
 
1  The facts are drawn from Simko’s complaint and 
exhibits to the parties’ briefs in support of, and opposition to, 
U.S. Steel’s motion to dismiss.  In reviewing a dismissal under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we “must consider 
only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters 
of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents 
if the complainant’s claims are based upon these 
documents.”  Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 
2010); see also Levins v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp. 
LLC, 902 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir. 2018).  The parties have not 




disabled and should not work anywhere in the plant.”  App. 34.  
The EEOC received the charge on May 28, 2013.  By letter 
dated August 7, 2013 to the EEOC, a U.S. Steel Labor 
Relations official denied Simko’s allegations of 
discrimination.  The EEOC did not take any action to 
investigate the charge or U.S Steel’s August 7, 2013 letter. 
On December 30, 2013—while Simko’s charge was 
still pending—U.S. Steel discharged Simko after an incident in 
which a car he was operating lost power.  Approximately five 
months later, on May 27, 2014, Simko entered into a “last 
chance agreement” with U.S. Steel and his union providing for 
his reinstatement.  Simko returned to work under the last 
chance agreement on June 1, 2014, but he was discharged again 
on August 19, 20142—this time, based on a safety violation.  
Although Simko grieved the discharge through his union, the 
union later withdrew the grievance.   
B. The November 2014 Correspondence 
On November 14, 2014,3 approximately three months 
after Simko’s final discharge from U.S. Steel, the EEOC 
received an undated handwritten letter and set of documents 
from Simko (“November 2014 correspondence”).  The 
November 2014 correspondence comprised 14 pages, 
including what appears to be Simko’s handwritten notes 
regarding a union hearing on the violation of his last chance 
agreement, a copy of his last chance agreement, copies of 
safety incident reports, and, in the final three pages, a 
handwritten note that urged that he was discharged in 
retaliation for his filing of the original discrimination charge 
with the EEOC.  In relevant part, the letter provided: 
Since I have filled [sic] the charges with the 
 
2  Simko initially received a five-day suspension, which 
was ultimately converted to a discharge.   
3  Simko and the EEOC allege that the EEOC received the 
November 2014 correspondence on November 14, 2014.  
Because U.S. Steel does not contest this allegation, we will, as 
the District Court did, assume its truth.  The November 2014 
correspondence was attached to Simko’s response to U.S. 





EEOC I have been terminated twice and placed 
on [a] last chance agreement with no just cause 
by the company.  The union only calls me at [the] 
last minute with information, they are not in 
contact with me otherwise . . . .  I believe anyone 
who familiarizes themself [sic] with the details of 
the case will clearly see it as retaliation for filing 
charges with the EEOC. 
App. 80–81 (emphasis added). 
 The EEOC did not take any action in response to 
Simko’s November 2014 correspondence until approximately 
one year later.  By letter dated November 23, 2015, an EEOC 
investigator notified Simko that he had been assigned to 
Simko’s case.  The investigator further wrote that, based upon 
the November 2014 correspondence, “it appears as though you 
have been terminated by [U.S. Steel] on two separate occasions 
during 2014 and that you believe that the terminations were 
retaliatory against you.”  App. 84.  Simko’s EEOC file also 
contains a handwritten note by the investigator, dated 
November 23, 2015, indicating that the EEOC contacted the 
U.S. Steel Labor Relations Department and confirmed that 
Simko had been discharged.4  In addition, the note stated, 
“Amended charge is to follow including retaliatory discharge.”  
App. 83.  
C. The EEOC Investigation, Amended Charge, 
and Simko’s Federal Lawsuit 
After the EEOC contacted Simko, he retained counsel 
to represent him in his EEOC proceedings.  By letter dated 
December 18, 2015, the EEOC investigator communicated to 
Simko’s counsel that the EEOC had notified U.S. Steel “that 
an amended charge was going to follow.”  App. 87.  On 
January 22, 2016, Simko’s counsel filed an amended EEOC 
charge.  The amended charge addressed Simko’s failure to 
secure the Spellman position and his subsequent discharges 
from U.S. Steel.  The boxes for disability discrimination and 
 
4  The EEOC investigator’s November 23, 2015 letter and 
handwritten note were not attached to the complaint but were 




retaliation were both checked.   
After investigating the allegations set forth in the 
amended charge, the EEOC on February 19, 2019 issued a 
determination of reasonable cause that U.S. Steel retaliated 
against Simko.  Specifically, the EEOC investigator found that 
U.S. Steel disciplined Simko more harshly for his violation of 
work rules and regulations than a non-disabled comparator.  
The EEOC attempted conciliation of the dispute, but after 
those efforts failed, it issued a right-to-sue letter on April 1, 
2019.  On June 28, 2019, Simko filed this lawsuit, asserting 
only a single count of retaliation in connection with his final 
discharge from U.S. Steel.  It did not allege either disability 
discrimination or failure to accommodate. 
The District Court determined that Simko failed to file 
a timely EEOC charge asserting his retaliation claim because 
his amended charge claiming retaliation was filed 521 days 
after the termination of his employment.  The District Court 
also held that Simko was not entitled to equitable tolling of the 
ADA’s filing deadline because he was not misled by the EEOC 
or prevented from filing the amended charge, and he offered 
no reason why he could not file a timely claim.  Thus, the 
District Court concluded that since Simko never filed a timely 
charge of retaliation with the EEOC, he failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies as required by the ADA, and it 
dismissed his complaint.  Simko timely appealed. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C 
§ 1291.  We review de novo a district court’s decision granting 
a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).  Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2014).  
In reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), we accept all 
well-pled factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw 
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  Connelly v. 
Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016).   
III. DISCUSSION 
Plaintiffs must exhaust their administrative remedies 




Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that 
claims asserted under the ADA must be filed in adherence with 
the administrative procedures set forth in Title VII); 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12117(a), 2000e-5.5  In Pennsylvania, an aggrieved party 
must initiate this pre-suit procedure by filing a charge with the 
EEOC within 300 days of the challenged employment action.  
Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 
2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).   
It is undisputed that Simko filed his amended EEOC 
charge of retaliation 521 days after the latest adverse 
employment action at issue in the civil complaint—his final 
discharge.  Before the District Court and on appeal, U.S. Steel 
urges that Simko’s civil complaint should therefore be 
dismissed because he failed to file the retaliation charge within 
the ADA’s 300-day filing period.   
Despite his failure to meet the 300-day deadline, Simko 
argues that he nonetheless satisfied the ADA’s pre-suit 
requirements.  The EEOC filed an amicus brief in which it also 
urges that, contrary to the District Court’s conclusion, Simko 
satisfied the ADA’s pre-suit filing requirements.6  Three 
arguments are advanced in the alternative.  First, both Simko 
and the EEOC contend that his handwritten November 2014 
 
5  While failure to file a timely charge may be a ground 
for dismissal, that pre-suit requirement does not implicate a 
district court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  Rather, “like a 
statute of limitations, [the filing deadline is] subject to waiver, 
estoppel, and equitable tolling.”  Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982); see also Fort Bend Cty., Texas 
v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2019) (holding that the 
“charge-filing requirement is a processing rule, albeit a 
mandatory one, not a jurisdictional prescription delineating the 
adjudicatory authority of courts”). 
6  We noted at oral argument that it was unusual for the 
EEOC to file an amicus brief in support of an appellant in 
Simko’s position.  Counsel for the EEOC stated that the agency 
“made a mistake” by failing to help Simko convert his 
November 2014 correspondence into a charge in a timely 
manner.  We appreciate the EEOC’s candor, but its acceptance 





correspondence to the EEOC itself constituted a timely 
administrative charge.  Second, the EEOC alone argues that 
Simko was entitled to equitable tolling of the statutory filing 
period because the agency failed to promptly act on the 
November 2014 correspondence.  Third, both Simko and the 
EEOC urge that he did not have to file an additional EEOC 
charge because his original, still-pending disability 
discrimination charge encompassed his subsequent claim of 
retaliation.   
We reject these arguments.  The first argument was 
never asserted in the District Court and has not been properly 
preserved for our review.  The second argument was raised 
only by the EEOC on appeal and, for reasons we explain 
below, will not be considered.  With respect to the final 
argument, we conclude that Simko’s retaliation claim is 
distinct from his underlying EEOC charge and therefore 
needed to be raised first in a timely filed charge.  His failure to 
file a timely retaliation claim with the EEOC therefore dooms 
his case. 
A. We Will Not Reach the Unpreserved Issue of 
Whether the November 2014 Correspondence 
Constituted a Charge 
Simko and the EEOC both contend that the District 
Court should have concluded that the November 2014 
correspondence—which was sent within 300 days of Simko’s 
final discharge—itself constituted a timely EEOC charge that 
may serve as the basis for his federal lawsuit.  They urge that, 
despite its informal appearance, Simko’s handwritten 
correspondence included all of the required contents of an 
administrative charge.  But as U.S. Steel points out, Simko 
never raised this issue before the District Court.  In its opinion, 
the District Court sua sponte commented on the handwritten 
letter, stating that it “d[id] not constitute a ‘charge’ and Simko 
d[id] not contend otherwise.”  Simko v. United States Steel 
Corp., No. CV 19-765, 2019 WL 6828421, at *3 (W.D. Pa. 
Dec. 13, 2019).  Simko and the EEOC now, for the first time, 
contend otherwise.  
It is well-established that arguments raised for the first 
time on appeal are not properly preserved for appellate review.  




2006); see also Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 
F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We generally refuse to consider 
issues that the parties have not raised below.”).  The general 
rule requiring preservation “serves several important judicial 
interests,” such as protecting the parties from unfair surprise, 
“preventing district courts from being reversed on grounds that 
were never urged or argued before [them],” and promoting 
finality and the conservation of judicial resources.  Tri-M Grp., 
LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 263 
(3d Cir. 2009)). 
As a preliminary matter, the District Court’s cursory 
statement that Simko’s handwritten correspondence did not 
constitute a charge is, alone, insufficient to preserve that issue 
for our review.  U.S. Steel contends that, by failing to raise that 
issue before the District Court, Simko waived any argument to 
the contrary.  Although we agree with U.S. Steel that Simko 
did not preserve his argument on appeal, we think that, under 
our most recent precedent, Simko’s failure is better 
characterized as “forfeiture,” not “waiver.”  See Barna v. Bd. 
of Sch. Directors of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 
146–47 (3d Cir. 2017).  In Barna, we distinguished the two 
terms, noting that “[t]he effect of failing to preserve an 
argument will depend upon whether the argument has been 
forfeited or waived.”  Id. at 146.  Waiver is the intentional 
abandonment of an argument.  Id. at 147.  In contrast, forfeiture 
“‘is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,’ an 
example of which is an inadvertent failure to raise an 
argument.”  Id. at 147 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 
U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).  Because Simko’s failure to argue 
before the District Court that the November 2014 
correspondence qualified as a charge appears inadvertent, we 
treat that argument as forfeited.  See PDX N., Inc. v. Comm’r 
N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d 871, 886 (3d 
Cir. 2020). 
While a court may not entertain waived arguments on 
appeal, it may review forfeited arguments, but under only 
“truly ‘exceptional circumstances.’”  Barna, 877 F.3d at 147 
(quoting Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 799 (3d 
Cir. 2001)).  These circumstances are “very ‘limited,’” id. 




“the public interest requires that the issue[s] be heard or when 
a manifest injustice would result from the failure to consider 
the new issue[s],” United States v. Anthony Dell’Aquilla, 
Enters. & Subsidiaries, 150 F.3d 329, 335 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Altman v. Altman, 653 F.2d 
755, 758 (3d Cir. 1981)).  Here, Simko offers no reasons for 
his failure to urge before the District Court that his handwritten 
correspondence and accompanying documents qualified as a 
charge.  Moreover, there is no public interest implicated or 
manifest injustice, particularly because Simko knew how to 
file a formal EEOC charge, as he had done in May 2013.  In 
short, there are no exceptional circumstances justifying 
departure from our rule requiring preservation.  Accordingly, 
we will not address this issue.  
B. Nor Will We Address the District Court’s 
Ruling on Equitable Tolling 
In its amicus brief, the EEOC alone urges that the 
District Court erred by concluding that Simko was not entitled 
to equitable tolling of the 300-day statutory filing period.  
Specifically, the EEOC contends that, if the November 2014 
correspondence did not qualify as an administrative charge, the 
EEOC’s failure to promptly convert it to a charge should 
warrant equitable tolling of the statutory deadline for Simko.  
Although Simko litigated the equitable tolling issue before the 
District Court, he did not present it to us as an issue on appeal.  
We have held that the role of an amicus brief is to “elaborate[] 
issues properly presented by the parties,” not “inject[] new 
issues into an appeal.”  N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Sidamon-
Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 382 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d 
Cir. 2001)).  Thus, “[a]n amicus normally ‘cannot expand the 
scope of an appeal with issues not presented by the parties on 
appeal,’ at least not ‘in cases where the parties are competently 
represented by counsel.’”  Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v. Senju 
Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Nuveen Mun. Tr. ex rel. Nuveen High Yield 
Mun. Bond Fund v. WithumSmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 
300 n.10 (3d Cir. 2012)).  By raising the equitable tolling issue, 
the EEOC attempts to resurrect an issue that Simko abandoned 
on appeal.  Accordingly, we will not reconsider the District 




C. Simko’s Original EEOC Charge Did Not 
Encompass His Subsequent Retaliatory 
Discharge Claim 
Simko’s main argument on appeal is that he was not 
required to file a timely retaliation charge because his 
retaliation claim was encompassed within his still-pending 
original charge of disability discrimination.  U.S. Steel 
responds, as it did before the District Court, that Simko’s 
retaliation claim cannot be bootstrapped to the original charge 
because the two sets of allegations are sufficiently distinct, and 
under the analysis required by our precedent, Simko should 
have filed a separate charge for the retaliation claim.  We agree 
with U.S. Steel on this issue.   
As noted above, the ADA requires that a plaintiff 
administratively exhaust all claims before seeking relief in 
federal court.  Burgh v. Borough Council of Borough of 
Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 2001); 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12117(a), 2000e-5(b).  These pre-suit requirements, which 
include the step of filing a charge and receiving a right-to-sue 
letter from the EEOC, are “essential parts of the statutory plan, 
designed to correct discrimination through administrative 
conciliation and persuasion if possible, rather than by formal 
court action.”  Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 
394, 398 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Anjelino v. New York Times 
Co., 200 F.3d 73, 94 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he purpose of the 
filing requirement is to enable the EEOC to investigate and, if 
cause is found, to attempt to use informal means to reach a 
settlement of the dispute.”).  The Supreme Court has also 
emphasized that a fundamental aim of the pre-suit 
requirements is to “give prompt notice to the employer” and 
“encourage the prompt processing of all charges of 
employment discrimination.”  Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109, 121 (2002) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The exhaustion requirement thus advances the 
remedial purposes of the ADA. 
The “relevant test” for determining whether a later 
claim needs to be exhausted despite the filing of a previous 
charge is a two-pronged inquiry into whether “the acts alleged 
in the subsequent . . . suit are fairly within the scope of [1] the 




therefrom.”7  Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 
1984); see also Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1025 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (identifying the “two circumstances in which events 
subsequent to a filed [EEOC] complaint may be considered as 
 
7  The Waiters inquiry is a disjunctive test—that is, a 
plaintiff need not file an additional EEOC charge if the 
allegations of the civil complaint are fairly within the scope of 
(1) the pending EEOC charge or (2) the investigation arising 
from the charge.   
As Simko notes, however, on at least two occasions, we 
have treated the inquiry as being conjunctive.  For example, in 
Hicks v. ABT Associates, Inc., we determined that a  
finding that the EEOC would have discovered a 
claim for sex discrimination in the course of a 
reasonable investigation does not itself meet the 
standard of Ostapowicz [and satisfy the 
exhaustion requirement].  This evidence merely 
rebuts the presumption that the scope of the 
actual investigation is “what can reasonably be 
expected to grow out of the charge of 
discrimination.”  541 F.2d at 398–99.  The 
district court must further find that the sex 
discrimination claims which would have been 
uncovered were reasonably within the scope of 
the charge filed with the EEOC.  
572 F.2d 960, 967 (3d Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).  In Howze 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., which was decided less than 
a year after Waiters, we summarized Hicks as holding that a 
“district court may assume jurisdiction over additional charges 
if they are reasonably within the scope of the complainant’s 
original charges and if a reasonable investigation by the EEOC 
would have encompassed the new claims.”  750 F.2d 1208, 
1212 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).  The Howze court 
notably failed to mention Waiters.   
Notwithstanding this minor conflict of authority, since 
Howze we have consistently applied the disjunctive 
formulation of the exhaustion test set forth in Waiters.  See 
Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1295 (3d Cir. 1996); Robinson v. 
Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1025 (3d Cir. 1997); Mandel v. M & Q 
Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2013).  





fairly encompassed within that complaint”).     
The exhaustion inquiry is highly fact specific.  Under 
our precedent, the Court must “examine carefully the prior 
pending EEOC complaint and the unexhausted claim on a case-
by-case basis before determining that a second complaint need 
not have been filed.”  Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1024.  Simko and 
the EEOC urge that we should adopt the broad per se rule 
followed by some courts of appeals that treat post-charge 
claims of retaliation as exhausted when they arise during the 
pendency of a prior charge.  See, e.g., Duplan v. City of New 
York, 888 F.3d 612, 622 (2d Cir. 2018); Nealon v. Stone, 958 
F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992); Gupta v. E. Texas State Univ., 
654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981).  We have said, however, 
that such a per se rule, “whether express or applied in practice, 
would eviscerate the remedial purposes of the exhaustion 
requirement.”  Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1024.  We have already 
rejected this per se argument and will adhere to our precedent 
that requires a careful examination of the nature of the relevant 
claims.  See Waiters, 729 F.2d at 237 n.10 (declining to adopt 
what the Court characterized as the Fifth Circuit’s rule that “all 
claims of ‘retaliation’ against a discrimination victim based on 
the filing of an EEOC complaint are ‘ancillary’ to the original 
complaint”); Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1024 (also rejecting a per 
se rule that post-charge retaliation claims “necessarily fall[] 
within the scope of . . . [previously filed, still-pending EEOC] 
complaints”).8 
Even interpreting Simko’s charge liberally under our 
fact-specific approach, the retaliation claim based on his 
August 2014 termination does not fall fairly within the scope 
of either (1) his original charge of disability discrimination 
based on his being denied the Spellman position in August 
2012, or (2) the EEOC investigation arising therefrom.  See 
 
8  Similarly, Simko urges that his retaliation claim is 
sufficiently related to his original charge of disability 
discrimination under our case-by-case approach because, by 
definition, retaliation requires a “predicate action protected by 
the ADA,” and his original charge “was a prerequisite to the 
existence of the retaliation claim.”  Appellant’s Br. 62.  
Because such an argument merely restyles the same per se rule 




Waiters, 729 F.2d at 235; see also Mandel v. M & Q Packaging 
Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2013); Robinson, 107 F.3d 
at 1025; Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1295 (3d Cir. 1996).  We 
address both prongs of the analysis in turn. 
Simko concedes that his retaliation claim fails the first 
prong of the exhaustion analysis.  Simply put, no allegations of 
retaliation appeared on the face of his original EEOC charge.  
Simko failed to check the box indicating a claim of retaliation 
and his narrative contained no reference to conduct that could 
be construed as retaliatory.  As U.S. Steel argues, “the legal 
theories in the original charge and amended charge are not the 
same, the incidents are not the same, the individuals involved 
are not the same, the work locations are not the same, and the 
time-periods are not the same.”  Appellee’s Br. 20–21.  
Accordingly, Simko’s retaliatory discharge claim does not fall 
fairly within the scope of his EEOC charge. 
The central dispute in this case, however, concerns the 
second prong of the analysis—whether Simko’s claim of 
retaliation falls “fairly within . . . the investigation arising” 
from the initial EEOC charge.  Waiters, 729 F.2d at 237.  At 
this step of the analysis, we consider “the scope of the EEOC 
investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of 
the charge of discrimination.”  Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 398–
99.  Simko and the EEOC primarily argue that this prong may 
be satisfied simply based on the fact that the EEOC actually 
did investigate Simko’s retaliatory discharge claim, albeit 
more than two years after he filed his initial charge.9  To the 
contrary, our precedent emphasizes that the Court must look 
only at the scope of the EEOC investigation that would 
reasonably grow out of, or arise from, the initial charge filed 
 
9  Simko pushes this argument one step further: He urges 
that our case-by-case analysis and precedent are not even 
applicable in this case because the EEOC ultimately 
investigated his retaliation claim and issued a right-to-sue letter 
based on that claim.  He contends that our fact-specific 
exhaustion inquiry instead applies only in cases where either 
(1) the claim at issue was not presented to the EEOC or (2) the 
EEOC failed to investigate the claim.  We disagree.  No 
authority from our Court supports such a strict limitation on the 




with the EEOC, “irrespective of the actual content of the 
Commission’s investigation.”  Hicks v. ABT Assocs., Inc., 572 
F.2d 960, 966 (3d Cir. 1978);  see also Howze v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 750 F.2d 1208, 1212 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(holding that “[w]hether the actual EEOC investigation 
uncovered any evidence of retaliation is of no consequence” in 
determining whether a new claim of retaliation is encompassed 
in the original EEOC charge).  As such, we agree with the 
District Court’s characterization of our exhaustion analysis as 
“objective” rather than “subjective.”  Simko, 2019 WL 
6828421, at *7. 
Given the fact-specific nature of the exhaustion inquiry, 
our precedent in this area—Hicks, Waiters, Antol, and 
Robinson—provides useful guidance.  As these cases 
demonstrate, when determining whether a claim fairly or 
reasonably falls within the investigation arising from a charge, 
courts consider (1) whether the claim arises from the same set 
of facts that support the original charge and (2) whether the 
claim advances the same theory of discrimination as the 
original charge.  
In Hicks, the plaintiff filed an EEOC charge alleging 
only race discrimination, but later sued asserting, inter alia, 
claims of both race discrimination and sex discrimination.  572 
F.2d at 962–63.  The EEOC investigated the race 
discrimination claim but failed to investigate sex 
discrimination.  Id.  Nevertheless, we held that the actual 
EEOC investigation did not necessarily set the “outer limit” of 
the scope of the civil complaint.  Id. at 966.  Such a limitation 
would unfairly penalize a plaintiff for an “unreasonably narrow 
or improperly conducted” investigation by the EEOC.  Id.  
Thus, the issue was whether a reasonable investigation would 
include a sex discrimination claim. 
We noted that certain instances of sex discrimination 
alleged in Hicks’s civil complaint arose from the same conduct 
that supported his race discrimination claims and that there was 
evidence that the EEOC improperly failed to contact Hicks to 
discuss his charge after it was filed.  Id.  On those grounds, we 
remanded to the district court to determine “whether the . . . 
investigation reasonably would have included examination of 




need to have been exhausted by filing a separate charge.  Id. at 
966, 970. 
Waiters involved an investigation of retaliatory conduct 
that went beyond the four corners of the EEOC charge.  
Waiters filed a charge with the EEOC asserting a claim of sex 
discrimination under Title VII against her employer, and over 
a year later she filed a second charge alleging that the employer 
retaliated against her for having submitted the earlier 
complaint.  Waiters, 729 F.2d at 235.  After she filed the second 
charge, Waiters was discharged.  Id. at 236.  Waiters did not 
file a new charge based on her termination.  Id.  She then 
brought suit in federal court alleging that she was discharged 
in retaliation for exercising her rights under Title VII.  Id.   
The district court concluded that Waiters should have 
filed another charge with the EEOC after she was discharged 
and dismissed Waiters’s complaint for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies.  Id.  We reversed.  While Waiters’s 
second EEOC charge was limited to a specific instance of 
retaliation, the EEOC investigation extended beyond that 
individual allegation and uncovered a subsequent pattern of 
retaliatory harassment by different officials.  Id. at 235 n.2, 
238.  Although the post-charge retaliatory conduct involved 
different officials and episodes of misconduct that occurred 
over thirty months later, we held that “the core grievance—
retaliation—is the same and, at all events, it is clear that the 
allegations of the appellant’s complaint fall within the scope of 
the [EEOC’s] investigation of the charges contained in the . . . 
[second EEOC] complaint.”  Id. at 238.  Thus, Waiters did not 
need to file a separate charge regarding her new retaliatory 
discharge claim.  Id.   
We reached a different conclusion, on different facts, in 
Antol v. Perry.  In that case, Antol filed a federal lawsuit 
alleging both disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., and gender discrimination under 
Title VII for failure to hire.  Antol, 82 F.3d at 1293.  Although 
Antol exhausted his remedies with respect to his claim of 
disability discrimination, he never raised allegations of gender 
discrimination at any point in the administrative proceedings 
and the EEOC did not investigate gender discrimination.  Id. at 




disability discrimination charge d[id] not fairly encompass a 
claim for gender discrimination merely because investigation 
would reveal that Antol is a man and the two employees who 
received the positions [were] women.”  Id. at 1296.  In 
addition, we determined that the EEOC investigation properly 
focused on “the gravamen of Antol’s complaint—disability 
discrimination” and that neither the EEOC nor the employer 
had been put on notice of the new gender discrimination claim.  
Id.  Accordingly, Antol’s failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies for his gender discrimination claim barred that claim.  
Id. 
Robinson is our most recent precedential opinion 
addressing the exhaustion of claims arising from post-charge 
events.  There, we applied our fact-specific exhaustion inquiry 
to a post-charge claim of retaliatory discharge.  Robinson, 107 
F.3d at 1024.  Robinson filed three EEOC charges alleging 
racial discrimination and retaliation against his employer, the 
Navy, for denying him sick leave, placing him on unauthorized 
leave status, and issuing him an “indebtedness letter” for taking 
unapproved sick leave and creating an asbestos hazard.  Id. at 
1019, 1025.  After Robinson filed these charges, the Navy 
terminated his employment, pointing to his excessive 
unauthorized absences and the asbestos hazard—the subject 
matter of his prior charges—as the basis for his discharge.  Id. 
at 1019–20.  Robinson then brought suit in federal court 
claiming that he was discharged in retaliation for filing his 
three charges.  Id. at 1020.  He did not file an additional charge 
alleging retaliatory discharge and the EEOC did not investigate 
his termination.  Id. at 1025.  The district court dismissed 
Robinson’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies.  Id. at 1020.  On appeal, we noted that the district 
court had failed to examine the scope of the EEOC’s 
investigation, and—as in Hicks—we remanded to determine 
whether a reasonable investigation of Robinson’s charges 
would have included his retaliatory discharge allegation.  Id. at 
1026. 
We draw several principles from these precedents.  
Most importantly, the original charge is the touchstone of our 
exhaustion analysis.  See, e.g., Antol, 82 F.3d at 1296 (focusing 
on the “specifics of . . . [the] charge” in determining whether a 




examine the original charge’s contents to determine the 
reasonable scope of the EEOC investigation that would likely 
occur.  See Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1024.  Second, we parse the 
later claim and determine whether its allegations would be 
covered in that reasonable investigation.  See Hicks, 572 F.2d 
at 966.  At bottom, we must compare the two sets of allegations 
and evaluate whether they are sufficiently related such that a 
reasonable investigation of the original charge would address 
the subsequent, unexhausted claims.  In comparing the two sets 
of allegations, we look for factual similarities or connections 
between the events described in the claims, the actors involved, 
and the nature of the employer conduct at issue.  See id. at 965 
(noting that some instances of sex discrimination alleged in the 
civil complaint “arise from the same acts which support claims 
for race discrimination” described in the underlying charge).  
Such factual overlap alone, however, does not guarantee that 
the new allegations are encompassed by the original charge if 
they do not fall within the “gravamen” of the initial charge.  See 
Antol, 82 F.3d at 1296 (rejecting the male plaintiff’s attempt to 
recharacterize his disability discrimination claim for failure-to-
promote as a gender discrimination claim merely on the ground 
that two women secured positions over him).  But even if we 
find no factual nexus, we may also consider whether the two 
sets of allegations advance the same theory of discrimination, 
as in Waiters.  See 729 F.2d at 238.   
With these principles in mind, we turn to the fact pattern 
presented here.  Unlike in Waiters, the additional allegations 
that the EEOC investigated after it received the November 
2014 correspondence were only tenuously related to the 
substance of the original charge.  Simko’s original EEOC 
charge was based on the Transportation Department’s failure 
to accommodate his hearing disability and its alleged 
discrimination against him by its refusal to approve him for the 
Spellman position in August 2012.10  By contrast, the 
 
10  As the District Court noted, the fact that Simko’s 
original charge of disability discrimination also alleged that his 
“Walking Boss” made a discriminatory comment in November 
2012 about his hearing impairment does not sufficiently 
expand the effective scope of the original charge to include his 





retaliation claim that Simko later filed in the District Court 
alleges that his discharge from the Blast Furnace Department 
in August 2014 was in retaliation for his filing of the original 
discrimination charge.   
 The original EEOC charge and Simko’s civil complaint 
thus address discrete adverse employment actions that 
occurred approximately two years apart and involved different 
supervisors in different departments.  Under these facts, the 
scope of a reasonable investigation arising out of Simko’s 
initial charge would certainly include an inquiry into whether 
Simko was qualified for the Spellman position, U.S. Steel’s 
reasons for passing him over, and identification of the person 
who secured the position and why he or she was chosen.  While 
such an investigation could also inquire into whether any other 
adverse actions were taken against him relating to his disability 
or his having filed a charge, a reasonable investigation in this 
case would not have included an inquiry into Simko’s post-
charge firing.  Simko’s allegations of retaliation are too remote 
in time and substantively distinct from the allegations of 
disability discrimination for a reasonable EEOC investigation 
based on the original charge to encompass the later events.11  
And, importantly, the original charge and complaint allege 
 
discrimination is still too tenuously related in time and 
substance to Simko’s retaliatory discharge claim. 
11  Our dissenting colleague says that retaliation charges 
are intrinsically related to previous charges of 
discrimination.  We do not disagree with this as a general 
proposition, but the allegation that an adverse employment 
action occurred in retaliation for the filing of an initial EEOC 
charge does not necessarily mean that “a close nexus” of 
supporting facts, Hicks, 572 F.2d at 967, or a common “core 
grievance,” Waiters, 729 F.2d at 238, exist.  We have only held 
that unexhausted claims of retaliatory discharge fall within the 
scope of the investigation reasonably arising out of the original 
claim when the original claim included “the same retaliatory 
intent inherent in the [subsequent] retaliatory discharge 
claim.”  Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1026; see also Waiters, 729 
F.2d at 238 (“[T]he core grievance—retaliation—is the 
same.”).  We will not expand that exception to the exhaustion 





different types of discrimination—in one, disability 
discrimination and failure to accommodate and in the other, 
retaliation.  Absent “a close nexus” of supporting facts, Hicks, 
572 F.2d at 967, or a common “core grievance,” Waiters, 729 
F.2d at 238, we conclude that a reasonable investigation of 
Simko’s original charge of disability discrimination would not 
unearth facts about his allegations of retaliation nearly two 
years later.   
 Our dissenting colleague cites the appropriate test 
repeatedly: If discriminatory acts occur after a plaintiff files his 
EEOC charge, he need not file an additional charge if the new 
allegations are “fairly [or reasonably] within the scope of . . . 
the investigation arising” out of the initial charge.  Waiters, 729 
F.2d at 237.  As the dissent recognizes, in conducting this 
inquiry, we ask whether the new claim should “reasonably 
[have] be[en] expected to grow out of the [initial] charge.”  
Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 399.  However, the dissent fails to 
consider the facts in light of the test.  As we have done in the 
other cases applying our exhaustion analysis, we must look at 
the facts as they are alleged in the charge and the civil 
complaint.  And the facts here are unique.  
What was the initial charge?  Here, Simko claimed that 
U.S. Steel denied him a reasonable accommodation for his 
hearing disability and passed him over for a job because of that 
same disability.  The initial charge included no additional 
instances of unlawful discriminatory treatment, other than an 
allegation that some other employees made “negative 
comments” about Simko’s hearing impairment.  App. 34.  
Unlike the plaintiff in Hicks, Simko did not later allege a 
different theory of discrimination based on some of the same 
underlying acts that supported his initial theory of 
discrimination.  And unlike in Waiters, Simko’s initial charge 
of discrimination was not followed by subsequent instances of 
the same type of unlawful treatment.  As previously discussed, 
our exhaustion analysis is tied to the substance of Simko’s only 
timely-filed claim in this case: that he did not receive a 
reasonable accommodation and was denied the Spellman job 
due to his disability. 
The only other operative fact, namely Simko’s 




submitted the initial charge, when he alerted the EEOC that he 
was fired in retaliation for filing the charge.  But, would the 
allegedly retaliatory firing have been included in an 
investigation that could “reasonably be . . . expected to grow” 
out of the facts surrounding his original charge of disability 
discrimination, approximately two years prior?  Ostapowicz, 
541 F.2d at 399.  There is no basis in fact or law for an answer 
in the affirmative.  As we noted above, the scope of a 
reasonable investigation into Simko’s being passed over for a 
job based on his disability would have involved a limited 
inquiry.  If we were to say that his later claim of retaliation was 
encompassed by his—however distantly related—initial 
charge of disability discrimination, we would be establishing a 
de facto per se rule, contrary to our holdings in Waiters, 729 
F.2d at 237 n.10, and Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1024. 
The dissent urges that we should conclude Simko’s 
post-charge retaliation claim was encompassed in his original 
charge because his retaliation claim is strongly “tethered” to 
his initial charge of disability discrimination and failure to 
accommodate.  Dissent Op. 15.  We reject this conclusory 
assertion.  As relevant here, a “tether” actually exists only 
when the allegations in the later charge would fall within the 
reasonable scope of the investigation into the allegations of the 
original charge.  Simko’s situation fails that test.  The dissent 
glosses over the differences between the two very different 
types of allegations in the initial charge and the civil complaint 
and instead focuses on the fact that the EEOC actually 
investigated and attempted to conciliate Simko’s retaliation 
claim.  Those ex-post facts do not determine the reasonable 
scope of an EEOC investigation. 
Even if our exhaustion inquiry turned on the actual—
rather than reasonable—scope of investigation arising from a 
charge, Simko’s retaliation claim should still be dismissed.  
That is because the investigation in this case did not actually 
“aris[e]” from, Waiters, 729 F.2d at 237, or “grow out of,” 
Hicks, 572 F.2d at 967, the underlying discrimination charge.  
Critically, the EEOC failed to investigate Simko’s original 
charge, and during the approximately thirty-month delay 
between the filing of his original charge and the EEOC 
investigator’s response to his November 2014 correspondence, 




of a new, distinct claim.  It was due only to that extended delay 
and Simko’s handwritten November 2014 correspondence that 
the EEOC learned of, and was able to investigate, Simko’s new 
allegations while his original charge was still pending.   
Thus, the EEOC investigation did not actually grow out 
of the original charge.  Instead, the investigation arose from 
Simko’s handwritten correspondence.  After apparently taking 
no investigative action for over two years following its receipt 
of the original 2013 charge, the EEOC commenced its 
investigation only after an investigator read Simko’s 
correspondence and sent Simko a letter inquiring about his 
case.  Significantly, that letter—dated November 23, 2015, 
over a year after Simko’s November 2014 correspondence—
referenced only Simko’s retaliation allegations, further 
demonstrating that the EEOC acted on the basis of the 
November 2014 correspondence, not his original charge.  As 
we noted above, the EEOC file included a comment that an 
amended charge was to follow, “including retaliatory 
discharge.”  App. 83.  That amended charge, however, was not 
timely filed. 
Simko and the EEOC nevertheless urge that because the 
EEOC ultimately did investigate the retaliatory discharge 
claim, such an investigation must have been “reasonable,” 
rendering it unnecessary to file an additional timely charge.  
We disagree.   
As the District Court observed, this case does not 
involve an EEOC investigation that was unduly narrow, but 
rather, one that extended beyond the face of the operative 
EEOC charge.  Contrary to Simko and the EEOC’s arguments, 
however, we analyze claims excluded from an EEOC 
investigation in the same way that we analyze claims included 
in the investigation.  Our focus remains on the investigation 
that can “reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge.”  
Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 399.  This principle applies equally in 
cases where the EEOC failed to investigate a claim, see, e.g., 
Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1025; Hicks, 572 F.2d at 966, and cases 
where the EEOC broadened its investigation to cover claims 
not included in the charge, see Waiters, 729 F.2d at 238.  
Holding otherwise—that is, treating all investigated claims as 




choice to investigate certain employer conduct would set the 
bare minimum scope of a civil complaint while its failure to 
investigate other conduct would not restrict the “outer limit” of 
the complaint, Hicks, 572 F.2d at 966.  Such a rule would 
undermine the remedial aims of the pre-suit filing requirements 
by permitting a charging party to “greatly expand an 
investigation simply by alleging new and different facts when 
he was contacted by the [EEOC] following his charge.”  Id. at 
967.  Simko’s November 2014 correspondence did just that—
it introduced new allegations of retaliation based on facts 
distinct from those alleged in his original charge.   
Simko and the EEOC’s other arguments that his 
retaliatory discharge claim fell within the scope of a reasonable 
EEOC investigation are unpersuasive.  They both contend that 
EEOC investigations are entitled to a presumption of regularity 
and that, in essence, we should “assume that the EEOC would 
not expend time or resources investigating matters unrelated to 
a pending charge.”  EEOC’s Br. 24; see also Hicks, 572 F.2d 
at 966.  In support of this position, they point to EEOC internal 
policies, reflected in the EEOC’s Compliance Manual, which 
govern the scope of investigations and the circumstances in 
which the EEOC may broaden an investigation.  For example, 
these policies direct investigators to remain alert to evidence of 
retaliation during their investigations, inform their supervisors 
in case such evidence surfaces, and notify the employer that 
“the scope may be expanded or limited based on information 
received during the investigation.”  EEOC Compl. Man. § 
22.3, Scope of Investigation, 2006 WL 4673367; see also 
EEOC Compl. Man. § 2.8, Charges Warranting Priority 
Handling, 2006 WL 4672924; EEOC Compl. Man. § 13.1, 
Litigation for Temporary or Preliminary Relief: Introduction, 
2006 WL 4673012.   
In light of these practices and the presumption of 
investigative regularity, Simko and the EEOC urge that it was 
reasonable for the EEOC to broaden the investigation beyond 
the four corners of the original charge and that Simko’s 
retaliation claim therefore satisfies the second prong of the 
exhaustion inquiry.  We reject this argument on two grounds.  
First, a rebuttable presumption of regularity does not foreclose 
judicial review of the scope of EEOC investigations, as Simko 




the district court to “evaluate the reasonableness of the decision 
not to investigate”); Antol, 82 F.3d at 1296 (holding that the 
investigation “quite properly” focused on Antol’s disability 
discrimination claim).  Here, the EEOC’s inaction for over two 
years on Simko’s original charge is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption that its subsequent investigation of Simko’s 
charge was regular or reasonable.12   
Second, the EEOC Compliance Manual does not 
persuade us that a reasonable investigation of the original 
charge in this case would have included the post-charge 
retaliation allegations.  We do not question the EEOC’s policy 
that officials prioritize retaliation claims or inquire about 
possible retaliation while investigating a discrimination 
charge.  Nor do we question that the EEOC often changes the 
scope of investigations based on the information it gathers 
during the investigative process.  Nevertheless, the significant 
 
12  We recognize that limited resources and the significant 
volume of charges filed with the EEOC each year make some 
amount of administrative delay inevitable.  For example, in 
Fiscal Year 2019 alone, the EEOC received 72,675 charges of 
workplace discrimination.  See Press Release, U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Releases Fiscal 
Year 2019 Enforcement and Litigation Data (Jan. 24, 2020), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-releases-fiscal-year-
2019-enforcement-and-litigation-data (last visited Mar. 26, 
2021).   
Nevertheless, two points of reference underscore that 
the EEOC’s delay in this case was out of the ordinary.  First, 
under the ADA, a charging party must permit the EEOC a 
minimum of 180 days to investigate and attempt to resolve his 
dispute, only after which he may demand a right-to-sue letter 
and proceed to federal court.  See Occidental Life Ins. Co. of 
California v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 360–61 (1977); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(f)(1).  Second, according to the EEOC, the average 
length of an investigation is approximately ten months.  See 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, What You 
Can Expect After You File a Charge, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/what-you-can-expect-after-you-file-
charge (last visited Mar. 26, 2021).   
In this case, the agency’s delay in initiating its 




differences between Simko’s original charge of disability 
discrimination and his later claim of retaliatory discharge 
foreclose the possibility that a reasonable investigation would 
have reached his post-charge claim, even in light of the 
EEOC’s own practices.13  
Relatedly, we do not give more weight to these 
arguments about exhaustion merely because the EEOC itself 
has taken the position that a reasonable investigation would 
have encompassed Simko’s retaliation claim.  Courts refuse to 
defer to the EEOC’s litigation position when, as here, it is “not 
embodied in any formal issuance from the agency, such as a 
regulation, guideline, policy statement or administrative 
adjudication.”  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 485 n.3 
(1991) (White, J., concurring); see also Bowen v. Georgetown 
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988) (“Deference to what 
appears to be nothing more than an agency’s . . . litigating 
position would be entirely inappropriate.”).  Specifically, when 
a district court considers whether a plaintiff has exhausted his 
administrative remedies, “[n]o deference may be accorded the 
EEOC or the complaint investigator’s finding with respect to 
the plaintiff’s compliance.”  McBride v. CITGO Petroleum 
Corp., 281 F.3d 1099, 1105–06 (10th Cir. 2002).  Accordingly, 
we do not defer to the EEOC on the question of administrative 
exhaustion.   
Simko and the EEOC further assert that filing an 
additional EEOC charge was not necessary in this case because 
the purpose of the ADA statutory scheme was ultimately 
fulfilled: namely, the facilitation of an informal dispute 
resolution process between Simko and U.S. Steel.  This 
argument, however, ignores two other fundamental aims of the 
exhaustion requirement: prompt notice to the employer and 
swift dispute resolution.  See, e.g., Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109 
(“[B]y choosing what are obviously quite short deadlines, 
 
13  The dissent characterizes what occurred after the EEOC 
received the November 14 correspondence as the agency 
“expanding” its investigation into Simko’s initial charge.  
Dissent Op. 12.  The EEOC did no such thing.  There never 
was a disability discrimination investigation in the first place.  
Instead, the EEOC embarked on a discrete investigation into 




Congress clearly intended to encourage the prompt processing 
of all charges of employment discrimination.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e)(1) 
(requiring that the EEOC serve notice on the employer against 
whom the charge is made within 10 days of the filing of the 
charge).  In addition to advancing those goals, the Supreme 
Court has emphasized that “strict adherence” to the ADA’s 
procedural requirements “is the best guarantee of evenhanded 
administration of the law.”  Morgan, 536 U.S. at 108 (quoting 
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980)).   
While the EEOC did ultimately investigate and attempt 
pre-complaint conciliation between Simko and U.S. Steel, this 
process was significantly delayed.  Critically, U.S. Steel did 
not receive any notice of Simko’s retaliation claim until well 
after the end of the 300-day filing period.  The parties agree 
that U.S. Steel was informally notified of Simko’s retaliation 
allegations no earlier than November 23, 2015—the day of the 
EEOC investigator’s note to Simko’s file—and no later than 
December 18, 2015—the day of the investigator’s letter to 
Simko’s counsel stating that he had informed U.S. Steel about 
the amended charge to be filed.  This means that U.S. Steel did 
not receive even informal notice of the retaliatory discharge 
claim until some point between 161 days and 186 days after 
the filing period expired.  Moreover, U.S. Steel was not 
formally put on notice of the retaliatory discharge claim until 
after Simko’s counsel filed his amended EEOC charge on 
January 22, 2016, 221 days after the end of the filing period.  
Given this timeline, excusing the exhaustion requirement for 
Simko’s retaliation claim would undercut the Supreme Court’s 
emphasis on “strict adherence” to the pre-suit requirements and 
the statutory scheme’s aims of notice and prompt dispute 
adjudication.  See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 108–09. 
We thus conclude that Simko’s subsequent retaliation 
claim would not have fallen within the reasonable scope of an 
EEOC investigation into his original discrimination charge.  
Accordingly, his retaliation claim fails the second prong of the 
exhaustion inquiry.   
While it is unfortunate that Simko did not timely amend 
his initial charge on his own and that the EEOC did not 




cannot hold that the later claim is encompassed within the 
initial charge because Simko’s retaliatory discharge claim does 
not fairly, or reasonably, fall within the scope of his original 
charge or an EEOC investigation that would arise therefrom.  
Thus, he needed to file an amended charge advancing that 
claim within the ADA’s 300-day filing period.  Because he 
failed to do so, the District Court correctly dismissed his 
complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of Simko’s complaint.  
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
 
A petitioner need not file a new formal charge with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission if that charge is 
“within the scope of a prior EEOC complaint or the 
investigation which arose out of it.”1 I must respectfully dissent 
from the Majority opinion because the EEOC investigation of 
Simko’s retaliation claim was reasonably within the scope of 
the investigation arising out of Simko’s initial disability 
discrimination claim. Thus, Simko’s retaliation claim related 
back to his earlier timely disability discrimination claim and 
the District Court erred in dismissing Simko’s retaliation claim 




 In Pennsylvania, “a complainant has 300 days from the 
date of the adverse employment decision to file a claim with 
the [EEOC].”3 “The purpose of [the filing requirement] . . . is 
to afford the EEOC the opportunity to settle disputes through 
conference, conciliation, and persuasion, avoiding unnecessary 
action in court.”4  
 
1 Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 235 (3d Cir. 1984). 
2 I agree with my colleagues’ decision to dismiss the first two 
claims raised by Simko and the EEOC. Simko’s strongest 
argument would have been that his November 2014 letter to 
the EEOC should have been construed as a formal EEOC 
charge of retaliation.  However, that argument has been 
forfeited because Simko did not raise it before the District 
Court. See Maj. Op. at 8–10. I agree with my colleagues that 
the District Court’s cursory, sua sponte consideration of the 
issue—which simply noted that the letter did not constitute a 
charge and that Simko did not argue otherwise—is 
insufficient to preserve the issue. Id. at 9–10. We also cannot 
reach the EEOC’s claim that the court should have equitably 
tolled the charge-filing period during the time after Simko 
sent his November 2014 letter to the EEOC because the claim 
was not included in Simko’s notice of appeal. See id. at 10. 
3 Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
4 Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1296 (3d Cir. 1996). 
2 
 
 If, after a petitioner files a claim, subsequent 
discriminatory acts occur, the petitioner does not need to file a 
new formal charge with the EEOC so long as the new 
allegations “fall[ ] within the scope of a prior EEOC complaint 
or the investigation which arose out of it.”5 This “includ[es] 
new acts which occurred during the pendency of proceedings 
before the Commission.”6 This is quite reasonable because 
“additional charges filed during the pendency of the 
administrative proceedings may fairly be considered 
explanations of the original charge and growing out of it.”7 
 
Moreover, we liberally construe the scope of an EEOC 
complaint when considering whether a subsequent claim falls 
within the ambit of an earlier claim: “In determining the 
content of the original complaint for purposes of applying 
[relation back], we keep in mind that charges are most often 
drafted by one who is not well versed in the art of legal 
description. Accordingly, the scope of the original charge 
should be liberally construed.”8 Indeed, that is precisely the 
situation here. The letter that led to the EEOC’s eventual 
investigation was handwritten by Simko, a lay plaintiff with no 
legal training or experience. We have also previously 
concluded that where the petitioner “attempted to amend his 
[EEOC] charge,”9 but failed to do so, he could still bring a civil 
action based on the charge that he attempted to include. Even 
 
5 Waiters, 729 F.2d at 235 (emphasis added); see also id. 
(“Since we conclude that appellant’s current claim falls 
within the scope of the prior investigation, and that appellant 
would be entitled to sue on the complaint that led to that 
investigation, appellant was free to bring this suit without 
further exhausting her administrative remedies.”). 
6 Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 398–99 
(3d Cir. 1976). See also Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 
1025 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing that even where an 
investigation was “broadened by the EEOC” and included 
“events that occurred after the filing of the informal 
complaint,” we concluded “there was nothing to be served by 
requiring [claimant] to file a second complaint”).  
7 Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 399. 
8 Hicks v. ABT Assocs., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 965 (3d Cir. 
1978). 
9 Id. at 964. 
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a failed attempt to amend a charge “create[d] an excuse for the 
failure to file a[n amended] charge.”10 
  
 We have established two factors to determine if a claim 
of discrimination relates back to a prior claim. We look to see 
whether the subsequent claim “(1) falls within the scope of a 
prior EEOC complaint, or (2) falls within the scope of the 
EEOC ‘investigation which arose out of it.’”11 The first inquiry 
is determined by the face of the complaint itself. To resolve the 
second inquiry, we look at the content and results of the EEOC 
investigation to determine if the new claim should “reasonably 
[have] be[en] expected to grow out of the [initial] charge.”12  
 
Here, Simko timely filed a disability discrimination 
claim against U.S. Steel.13 While that claim was pending before 
the EEOC, he was fired.14 He subsequently wrote to the EEOC 
detailing his belief that he was fired in retaliation for filing his 
initial discrimination claim. He wrote, “I believe anyone who 
familiarizes themself [sic] with the details of the case will 
clearly see it as retaliation for filing charges with the EEOC.”15 
The EEOC then expanded the disability discrimination 
investigation to include retaliation.16 The EEOC notified U.S. 
 
10 Id. 
11 Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1025 (citing Waiters, 729 F.2d at 
235). 
12 Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 399. Some claims that were not 
presented to the EEOC at all may still proceed in District 
Court because we have held that the actual EEOC 
investigation does not necessarily “set[] the outer limit to the 
scope of the civil complaint.” Hicks, 572 F.2d at 966. We 
have allowed some of these unexhausted claims to proceed so 
as not to punish the claimant for a failure of the EEOC. We 
have concluded that “[i]f the EEOC’s investigation is 
unreasonably narrow or improperly conducted, the plaintiff 
should not be barred from his statutory right to a civil action.” 
Id. 
13 App. 33. 
14 App. 25. 
15 App. 80–81. 
16 App. 84. 
4 
 
Steel, investigated the claim, found evidence of retaliation, and 
attempted to conciliate the claim.17 
 
Simko concedes that his initial complaint alleged only 
disability discrimination and did not include a charge of 
retaliation.18 Accordingly, we must determine whether the 
retaliation claim could “reasonably [have] be[en] expected to 
grow out of the [initial disability discrimination] charge.”19 As 
I explain below, a number of factors govern that 
reasonableness inquiry. These include the normal course of 
EEOC investigations, whether the petitioner attempted to 
amend the claim to include the additional charge, and whether 
the claim was actually investigated.   
 
My colleagues’ analysis of the reasonableness of the 
scope of the EEOC’s investigation is guided by four cases: 
Hicks, Waiters, Antol, and Robinson.20 In each of these cases, 
we considered whether claims that petitioners brought for the 
first time before the District Court (and that had not been filed 
with the EEOC) could relate back to earlier discrimination 
claims that each petitioner had properly filed with the EEOC. 
Each petitioner in those cases claimed that the new charge s/he 
filed related back to the earlier-filed charge. Below, I discuss 
some the principles that we can take from these cases. While 
these cases are instructive, I realize that none of them 
addressed the issue before us now—whether an EEOC 
investigation was too broad and thus unreasonable such that an 
actually investigated claim should be prevented from 
proceeding in District Court. I do not believe that the facts here 
justify concluding that the EEOC’s investigation was 
unreasonably broad. 
 
Indeed, we have cautioned that, in conducting an 
inquiry into reasonableness, “[t]he individual employee should 
not be penalized by the improper conduct of the 
 
17 App. 106; App. 112–17. 
18 This, however, of course is true with any charge alleging 
retaliation for filing a substantive discrimination charge 
because the discrimination charge must predate the 
retaliation. 
19 Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 399. 
20 See Maj. Op. at 15–18. 
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Commission.”21 We have also reaffirmed the “sound and 
established policy that procedural technicalities should not be 
used to prevent Title VII claims from being decided on the 
merits.”22 In short, errors by the EEOC should not affect a 




 The petitioner in Hicks brought a claim before the 
District Court alleging race and sex discrimination even though 
he had only filed a race discrimination charge with the EEOC. 
The District Court concluded that it did not have “jurisdiction 
over Hicks’s claims of sex discrimination because a charge of 
such discrimination had not been filed with the EEOC.”23 We 
reversed. We held that Hicks’ failure to formally file a sex 
discrimination charge with the EEOC did not “preclude[] 
jurisdiction over the sex discrimination claims.”24 That holding 
was based upon two considerations. First, there was evidence 
that Hicks “reasonably attempted to amend his charge to 
include sex discrimination” but the EEOC erred in failing to 
amend the claim.25 This, we found, “create[d] an excuse for the 
failure to file a sex discrimination charge”26 regardless of 
whether Hicks attempted to amend the charge within the 
statutory filing period.27  
 
Second, we concluded that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether a properly conducted EEOC 
investigation would have included an inquiry into sex 
 
21 Hicks, 572 F.2d at 964–65. 
22 Seredinski v. Clifton Precision Prods. Co., 776 F.2d 56, 65 
(3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Gooding v. Warner-Lambert Co., 744 
F.2d 354, 358–59 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
23 Hicks, 572 F.2d at 963. 
24 Id. at 964. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. (“The record does not indicate whether the attempt to 
incorporate sex discrimination in the EEOC charge was made 
within the required 180-day statutory period. Our resolution 
of the amendment issue in this case does not depend on 




discrimination. Hicks alleged that he was not contacted by the 
investigator until the conclusion of the investigation.28 There 
was “sufficient evidence to raise a fair inference that Hicks 
would have told the EEOC investigator that he believed that 
sex discrimination was a cause of the disparate treatment 
alleged in his charge” had he been contacted earlier.29  
  
 We concluded that if, on remand, the District Court 
found either that (1) “the EEOC improperly failed to accept an 
amendment to Hicks’s charge which would have incorporated 
sex discrimination” or (2) “a reasonable investigation of the 
charge as filed would have encompassed the sex discrimination 
claims” we would have jurisdiction over the sex discrimination 
claim.30  
 
As part of the inquiry into whether “the sex 
discrimination claims [] would have been uncovered” we noted 
that “there [wa]s a close nexus between the facts supporting the 
claims of race and sex discrimination,”31 which increased the 
likelihood that they would have been uncovered. We also noted 
that “evidence of the investigatory practices of the agency” 
would help us “conclude whether a reasonable inquiry would 
have reached Hicks’s allegations.”32 
  
 The petitioner in Waiters filed a sex discrimination 
claim with the EEOC alleging that she had been passed over 
for a position in favor of a male applicant.33 One year later, she 
filed a second claim with the EEOC alleging that her employer 
had retaliated against her for filing that claim a year earlier.34 
The EEOC investigated the claim and found that there was 
support for Waiters’ allegations, but then the investigation was 
 
28 Id. at 966. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 967. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. In Hicks we noted that we did not have such evidence 
before us, so we could not consider whether the EEOC’s 
investigatory practices supported an assertion of jurisdiction 
over the unexhausted claim. Id. Fortunately, as my colleagues 
note, we have the benefit of the EEOC’s guidance here.  




dropped: “no further action was taken by the EEOC, [the] 
claim was never finally adjudicated by the agency, and no right 
to sue letter ever issued.”35 Waiters continued to work at the 
same employer, but in a different department on a different 
program. Approximately two years later, while working on the 
new program, she was fired.36 Her employer alleged 
misconduct unrelated to the conduct that her prior retaliation 
claim was based upon.37 Rather than filing another retaliation 
claim with the EEOC, she sued in District Court alleging that 
she had been fired in retaliation for filing her discrimination 
claims with the EEOC.38  
 
The District Court dismissed her action based on her 
failure to file a second retaliation charge with the EEOC 
specifically related to her discharge. We again reversed. We 
held that she need not have filed another retaliation claim even 
though years had passed since her prior claim and “the 
allegedly discriminatory officials and acts [in her prior claim 
we]re different” than the officials and acts that were the subject 
of her retaliation claim filed in the District Court.39 We held 
that even though the actors, acts, and departments were 
different, “[w]here discriminatory actions continue[d] after the 
filing of an EEOC complaint . . . the purposes of the statutory 
scheme [we]re not furthered by requiring the victim to file 
additional EEOC complaints.”40 Our reasoning rested upon 
two considerations. The “core grievance—retaliation—[wa]s 
the same” between Waiters’ new and prior charges. And “it 
[wa]s clear that the allegations of the appellant’s complaint 
f[e]ll within the scope of the [EEOC’s] investigation of the 
charges.”41 In other words, we found it relevant that the EEOC 
had already actually investigated retaliation against Waiters.  
 
The Majority focuses on two aspects of our decisions in 
Hicks and Waiters—the “close factual nexus” in Hicks, and the 
similarity of the substantive discrimination charges in 
 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 236. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 238. 
40 Id. at 237. 
41 Id. at 238.  
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Waiters—and concludes that one or both of these factors must 
be present in order for a subsequently filed claim to relate 
back.42 But, as I discuss below, neither opinion made either 
factor a prerequisite, and in so concluding, the Majority ignores 
other considerations that we found relevant to the relation back 
analysis in those decisions. 
  
 Several principles, in addition to those discussed by the 
Majority, emerge from Hicks and Waiters. First, there are 
multiple ways in which a petitioner can demonstrate that an 
unexhausted claim is reasonably within the scope of an earlier-
filed claim. As my colleagues recognize, a subsequent claim of 
discrimination or retaliation may reasonably relate back to an 
earlier-filed charge of discrimination if the filed and unfiled 
claims share a close factual nexus. But Hicks also establishes 
that “evidence of the investigatory practices of the agency” are 
relevant to our reasonableness determination.43 Stated another 
way, evidence from the agency itself, such as EEOC guidance 
showing that a properly conducted EEOC investigation would 
or should have reached the unexhausted claim, can help a 
petitioner establish that the unexhausted claim relates back to 
a properly filed claim.  
 
In addition, as my colleagues note, we consider whether 
a prior and subsequent claim of discrimination share the same 
core grievance in determining if a subsequent claim relates 
back to the prior claim. But we also look to see whether the 
EEOC actually investigated the unexhausted claim. The fact 
that the EEOC’s investigation of the charges include the 
substance of the unexhausted claim helps to establish that the 
claim reasonably fell within the scope of the prior complaint.44 
Finally, if a petitioner attempts to amend a charge and the 
EEOC erroneously fails to recognize the amendment, a 
petitioner may be excused from filing a new charge with the 
 
42 See Maj. Op. at 20. 
43 Hicks, 572 F.2d at 967. 
44 Waiters, 729 F.2d at 238 (concluding that the unexhausted 
claim was within the scope of the previous complaint in part 
because “it [wa]s clear that the allegations of the [District 
Court] complaint f[e]ll within the scope of the [EEOC’s] 
investigation of the charges”). 
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EEOC before bringing his or her claim before the District 
Court.45 
  
 Our holding today is inconsistent with our approach in 
Hicks and Waiters.  Moreover, my colleagues overlook that we 
have not previously held that a claim that was actually 
investigated by the EEOC was not reasonably within the scope 
of the initial charge that gave rise to the investigation. 
Although I agree that we can review the reasonableness of a 
completed EEOC investigation, I do not think my colleagues 
give sufficient weight to the fact that the EEOC actually 
investigated and attempted to conciliate Simko’s retaliation 
claim in determining the reasonableness of that investigation. 
Given our analysis in Hicks and Waiters, I am persuaded that 
the investigation here was reasonable and the investigation’s 
scope should not be viewed as unreasonable merely because of 
the delay that occurred.46 
III. 
 
Because “the EEOC has considerable expertise in the 
area of employment discrimination,”47 I am not as willing as 
 
45 Hicks, 572 F.2d at 967.  
46 In other cases, we have emphasized the importance of the 
EEOC actually having investigated the claim at issue. For 
example, in Ostapowicsz, we found vital that “conciliation 
discussions and proposals . . . between the Commission and 
the employer” included the new charge that was at issue 
there. 541 F.2d at 399. We noted that had the new charge at 
issue not been included in the investigation and conciliation 
efforts, “there would be some force to the defendant’s 
contention that Ostapowicz could not bring herself within the 
scope of the EEOC charge.” Id. But because the new charge 
was included in the conciliation efforts, we allowed it to 
proceed. Similarly, in Waiters, we found it persuasive that 
“the allegations of the [] complaint f[e]ll within the scope of 
the [EEOC’s] investigation of the charges.” 729 F.2d at 238. 
47 Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 
2005); see also, e.g., Butler v. West, 164 F.3d 634, 642 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (The EEOC has “a measure of expertise and 
familiarity with employment discrimination disputes that 
federal judges cannot readily match.”); Muller Optical Co. 
v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380, 395 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he EEOC 
10 
 
my colleagues to brush aside the EEOC’s own conclusion that 
it was reasonable to include the subsequent acts of retaliation 
in its investigation. 
 
This is particularly true when we consider that we 
liberally construe claims for the purpose of relation back.48 In 
addition, “[c]ourts have generally determined that the 
parameters of the civil action in the District Court are defined 
by the scope of the EEOC investigation . . . including new acts 
which occurred during the pendency of proceedings before the 
Commission.”49 It is also important to recall that we “presume 
the regularity of the EEOC’s investigation.”50 We should not 
lightly conclude that the EEOC’s commitment of resources and 
time to an investigation into discrimination was unreasonable. 
 
Accordingly, since the EEOC actually investigated 
Simko’s retaliation claim, we must begin with the presumption 
that the investigation was reasonable. And because “evidence 
of the investigatory practices of the agency” are relevant to 
determining “whether a reasonable inquiry would have reached 
[any additional] allegations,”51 we must also consider the 
EEOC’s general practices. These practices offer further 
support for the reasonableness of the investigation here.  
 
As the Majority recognizes, EEOC investigators are 
told to look for “evidence of retaliation during their 
investigations, inform their supervisors in case such evidence 
surfaces, and notify the employer that ‘the scope may be 
expanded or limited based on information received during the 
investigation.’”52 Indeed, the EEOC Manual states that “if it is 
 
has developed considerable expertise in the field 
of employment discrimination since Congress created it by 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”); Maskin v. Chromalloy Am. 
Corp., 1986 WL 4481, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 1986) 
(“The EEOC has special expertise in investigating charges of 
discrimination, and its expertise should not be ignored.”). 
48 Hicks, 572 F.2d at 965. 
49 Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 399–400. 
50 Hicks, 572 F.2d at 966. 
51 Id. at 967. 




found during the investigation that the charging party has been 
discriminated against because s/he filed the charge, [the] 
EEOC may investigate the retaliation issue based on the 
original charge.”53 Yet, my colleagues dismiss the importance 
of this statement in the Manual by focusing on the differences 
in the initial allegations of discrimination and the subsequent 
allegations of retaliation.54  
 
I submit, however, that the EEOC’s policy is eminently 
reasonable because even a minimally well-informed employer 
in today’s marketplace knows better than to admit that an 
employee was terminated in retaliation for filing a claim of 
discrimination. As we explained in Aman v. Cort Furniture 
Rental Corp.,55 “[d]efendants of even minimal sophistication 
will neither admit discriminatory animus or [sic] leave a paper 
trail demonstrating it.”56 All we need do is substitute 
“retaliatory animus” for “discriminatory animus” to appreciate 
the reasonableness of the EEOC’s policy and the scope of its 
investigation.  
  
 Neither party disputes that Simko’s initial disability 
discrimination charge in May 2013 was timely. While it was 
still pending before the EEOC, U.S. Steel fired Simko 
allegedly for unrelated reasons.57 In November 2014, a few 
months after being fired, while the disability discrimination 
charge was still pending before the EEOC, Simko wrote to the 
EEOC stating his belief that he was fired “as retaliation for 
filing charges with the EEOC.”58 Simko’s timely filed initial 
 
53 See EEOCCM, § 2.8 Charges Warranting Priority 
Handling, 2006 WL 4672924 (emphasis added). 
54 See Maj. Op. at 24–25. 
55 85 F.3d 1074 (3d Cir. 1996). 
56 Id. at 1082 (quoting Riordan v Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 
697 (7th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57 The mere fact that U.S. Steel claimed Simko was fired for 
job performance is of little import for the reasons articulated 
in Cort Furniture, supra.   
58 App. 80–81. As noted above, I agree with my colleagues 
that Simko’s argument that the November 2014 
correspondence should have been construed as a charge was 
forfeited because counsel failed to raise it below. See Maj. 
Op. at 8–10. But, the procedural default aside, as the EEOC 
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disability discrimination claim, therefore, is the alleged basis 
of the retaliation claim. It is difficult to see how the retaliation 
claim cannot be said to have, at least in part, grown out of the 
original charge. Absent the initial charge of discrimination, 
there would be no basis for the retaliation. 
 
As is regular practice at the EEOC, and as is explicitly 
contemplated by the EEOC guidance, an EEOC investigator 
wrote back to Simko and contacted U.S. Steel in November 
2015 to inform U.S. Steel that it was expanding its 
investigation into retaliation and that a formal retaliation 
charge was forthcoming.59 The EEOC investigated the 
retaliation claim on-site at U.S. Steel in September 2018.60 And 
in February 2019, the EEOC determined that there was 
reasonable cause to believe U.S. Steel had retaliated against 
Simko.61  
 
Having actually investigated and attempted to conciliate 
the retaliation claim, the EEOC fulfilled the purpose of the 
exhaustion requirement. We have previously stated that the 
“purpose of the filing requirement is to enable the EEOC to 
investigate and, if cause is found, to attempt to use informal 
means to reach a settlement of the dispute.”62 That happened 
here. U.S. Steel was a part of the EEOC’s investigation of the 
retaliation claim, including when the EEOC made a site visit.63 
U.S. Steel therefore was on notice of the investigation, invited 
to conciliate, and understood that it was facing a retaliation 
charge before Simko brought suit in District Court.  
 
All of these factors demonstrate the reasonableness of 
the investigation here and would do so even absent the 
presumption of reasonableness which attaches that 
 
itself recognizes, the agency very likely erred in failing to 
construe the correspondence as a formal charge.  
59 App. 83. 
60 App. 106. 
61 A112–14. 
62 Maj. Op. at 11 (citing Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 
F.3d 73, 93 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
63 App. 106. 
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investigation.64 Accordingly, “there [is] nothing to be served 
by requiring [Simko] to [have] file[d] a second complaint”65 
other than allowing U.S. Steel to escape any liability for 
conduct that Simko may be able to prove is illegal. Doing so 
undermines the statutory purpose and regulatory scheme of the 
EEOC. Because Simko’s “current claim falls within the scope 
of the prior investigation, and [he] would be entitled to sue on 
the complaint that led to that investigation, [Simko] was free 





The Majority concludes that despite the fact that the 
EEOC actually investigated and attempted to conciliate the 
claim, it does not relate back to the initial disability charge 
because it referenced events that were discrete and remote from 
the events referenced in the initial charge.67 But we have 
previously rejected similar arguments and concluded that 
claims may relate back even where they are based on discrete 
events, occurring years apart.  
 
In Waiters, 30 months elapsed between the initial 
charge and the adverse employment action, but we concluded 
that the claims related back. Just as U.S. Steel and the Majority 
argue here, the defendant there argued that the original charge 
and the retaliation claim were very different—“different 
officials are alleged to be responsible for the allegedly 
discriminatory acts, more than thirty months passed between 
the formal complaint and the discharge, and the alleged 
retaliatory acts are of a different nature.”68 The defendant 
therefore argued that this “preclude[d] us from holding that the 
claim based on the discharge is within the scope of the 
investigation that arose from the formal complaint.”69 We 
disagreed. We allowed the claim to proceed because “it [wa]s 
 
64 Hicks, 572 F.2d at 966 (“[C]ourts should presume the 
regularity of the EEOC’s investigation.”). 
65 Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1024–25. 
66 Waiters, 729 F.2d at 235. 
67 See Maj. Op. at 18–20. 




clear that the allegations of the appellant’s complaint fall 
within the scope of the district director’s investigation of the 
charges.”70 This was true even where “[t]he investigation 
clearly went beyond the specific problem alleged in the formal 
complaint.”71 So too here. Through no fault of Simko, the 
EEOC delayed investigating his claims—and, to its substantial 
credit, the EEOC concedes its error in delaying the 
investigation of Simko’s claim. Nevertheless, the retaliation 
claim was eventually part of the agency’s investigation and 
U.S. Steel participated in the investigation and conciliation 
process. 
 
The Majority also argues that the claims cannot relate 
back because disability discrimination is substantively 
different from retaliation. But we have previously concluded 
that claims that differ in kind may also relate back so long as 
they reasonably would have been included in the investigation 
of the initial charge. As described above, in Hicks we 
concluded that a charge of sex discrimination could relate back 
to a charge of race discrimination because, had the EEOC 
properly investigated the claim, the petitioner would have put 
the EEOC on notice of sex discrimination as well.72 Simko’s 
claims are connected with a much stronger tether than those in 
Hicks. Simko did communicate with the EEOC and put the 
agency on notice of the retaliation claim—a claim that was 
actually investigated. And although the court in Hicks noted 
that part of the reason it concluded the claims could relate back 
was because both the sex and race discrimination claims arose 
out of the same set of facts, here there is more to support the 
reasonableness of the investigation than was present in Hicks. 
Simko’s retaliation claim was actually investigated by the 
EEOC; moreover, the EEOC guidance instructs that 
investigations into retaliation arising out of discrimination 
claims are a normal part of the process and relate back to the 
initial charge of discrimination; and finally, the contemplated 
administrative process was fulfilled when Simko and U.S. 
 
70 Id. (emphasis added). 
71 Id. See also Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 399 (“The additional 
charges filed during the pendency of the administrative 
proceedings may fairly be considered explanations of the 
original charge and growing out of it.”). 
72 Hicks, 572 F.2d at 962. 
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Steel were involved in the investigation and conciliation 
process. As noted, “[t]he purpose of the filing requirement is 
to initiate the statutory scheme for remedying discrimination. . 
. . Thus, the effect of the filing requirement is essentially to 
permit the EEOC to use informal, non-judicial means of 
reconciling the differences between the charging party and an 
employer.”73  
 
Additionally, as I have argued above, we must not lose 
sight of the fact that claims of retaliation are intrinsically 
tethered to claims of discrimination; they rarely arise in a 
vacuum or in an environment devoid of claims of 
discrimination. Indeed, this is precisely why the EEOC’s 
policy of allowing investigations into substantive 
discrimination to include allegations of retaliation is so 
eminently reasonable. In fact, a contrary policy that would 
preclude or discourage inquiries into whether an employee 
alleging discrimination had suffered retaliation would be 
unreasonable. 
 
The Majority argues that considering the facts of 
Simko’s disability discrimination claim in light of the 
appropriate test demonstrates that any tether it has to the 
retaliation claim is “conclusory” and does not “actually 
exist[].”74 But in so arguing, my colleagues appear to ignore 
the clear connection between the two claims. Simko’s 
allegation that he was fired in retaliation for filing a disability 
discrimination claim means that his disability discrimination 
claim is both a factual and legal basis for his retaliation claim. 
Stated differently, his claim alleges that but for his filing of a 
disability discrimination claim, he would not have faced the 
allegedly retaliatory discharge. Such a connection between the 
claims is hardly “conclusory.”75 As I explain below, I agree 
 
73 Id. at 963 (citing Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 398.)  
74 Maj. Op. at 21. 
75 Curiously, on the one hand, the Majority agrees with the 
“general proposition” that “retaliation charges are 
intrinsically related to previous charges of discrimination,” 
Maj. Op. at 19 n.11, and it notes that a reasonable 
“investigation could [] inquire into whether any other adverse 
actions were taken against [Simko] relating to his disability or 
his having filed a charge,” id. at 19 (emphasis added), but, in 
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with the Majority that, due to our prior rejection of a per se rule 
which would have made all retaliation claims automatically 
relate back to the earlier claim upon which they were based,76 
a petitioner must show more than the simple fact that he or she 
filed a subsequent retaliation claim in order to be excused from 
having to file a second formal charge with the EEOC. But 
Simko has shown much more than that here.  
 
Concluding that Simko’s retaliation claim relates back 
here would not run afoul of our prior rejection of such a per se 
rule. It is not true that all such cases will evidence the apparent 
nexus between a prior discriminatory act and a subsequent 
discharge that appears here. Here it is not simply the fact that 
Simko alleged retaliation before the District Court that causes 
his claim to relate back. He attempted to amend his claim to 
include retaliation; he put the EEOC on notice that he 
suspected retaliation was the reason for his firing; and, of 
course, the EEOC actually investigated the retaliation claim, 
issued a right to sue letter, and attempted to conciliate the 
claim. All of these are factors which we have previously 
concluded support the reasonableness of allowing an 
unexhausted claim to proceed.77 The fact that Simko is alleging 
 
the same sentence, concludes that “a reasonable investigation 
in this case would not have included an inquiry into Simko’s 
post-charge firing.” Id. But if a reasonable inquiry could 
inquire into “[Simko] having filed a charge,” and Simko 
alleges that his having filed a charge is what caused his firing, 
then a reasonable inquiry would necessarily include “an 
inquiry into his post-charge firing.” That is what our 
precedent says. See, e.g., Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 398-99 
(Reasonable investigations may “includ[e] new acts which 
occurred during the pendency of proceedings before the 
Commission.”). And that is what the EEOC concluded when 
it investigated the post-charge firing and found that Simko 
was likely retaliated against. 
76 See Maj. Op. at 13, 21 (citing Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1024, 
and Waiters, 729 F.2d at 237 n.10). 
77 Indeed, as the following two examples demonstrate, there 
are other reasons why allowing Simko’s claim to relate back 
here would not create a per se rule. For example, consider the 
situation of a petitioner who files a timely race discrimination 
claim with the EEOC, but later brings a retaliation claim 
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a retaliation claim (as opposed to another type of 
discrimination claim) before the District Court only provides 
one added benefit—because EEOC investigators are 
specifically instructed to be alert to retaliation claims, the fact 
that he alleges retaliation makes it more reasonable to conclude 
that the investigation the agency conducted into the retaliation 
was proper. But, of course, not every litigant claiming 
 
before the District Court that was not brought before the 
EEOC. If, prior to filing in District Court, the petitioner (i) 
made no attempt to amend her claim to include retaliation; (ii) 
did not notify the EEOC that she suspected she was retaliated 
against for filing the race discrimination claim; and (iii) the 
EEOC did not actually investigate retaliation; the only tie to 
the prior race discrimination claim would be the fact that the 
new claim before the District Court was a retaliation claim. 
Although, as described above, there is some inherent 
connection between a retaliation claim and the substantive 
discrimination claim on which it is based, consonant with our 
rejection of a per se rule, this, on its own, would not be 
sufficient to show that the claim was “within the scope of a 
prior EEOC complaint or the investigation which arose out of 
it,” Waiters, 729 F.2d at 235, and therefore, petitioner’s claim 
would fail.  
 
Additionally, consider the situation in which an 
employee alleges that she was retaliated against for 
supporting her colleague’s disability discrimination claim. 
This retaliation claim would not relate back to, for example, a 
prior sex discrimination claim that the employee herself filed. 
It would not relate back because the retaliation claim would 
not have “grown out of the subject matter” of her earlier sex 
discrimination claim. That retaliation claim would not depend 
at all on the employee having first filed her sex discrimination 
claim. Rather, the basis from which this retaliation claim 
flowed would have been her support of her colleague’s 
disability discrimination claim. By contrast, here, because the 
retaliation is based on Simko’s own filing of a disability 
discrimination claim in his case, it does arise, at least in part, 
out of the subject matter of the initial charge. This, coupled 
with Simko’s case specific circumstances outlined above, is 
enough to show that the retaliation claim is properly within 
the scope of the investigation of Simko’s initial charge. 
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retaliation will be able to point to all of these additional factors 
in support.78 
 
Nevertheless, my colleagues press even further in 
rejecting the argument raised by Simko and joined by the 
EEOC that the retaliation claims relate back. My colleagues 
conclude that “[e]ven if our exhaustion inquiry turned on the 
actual—rather than reasonable—scope of investigation arising 
from a charge, Simko’s retaliation claim should still be 
dismissed[.]”79 They argue that result must follow because the 
investigation did not actually arise from the disability 
discrimination charge. Rather, my colleagues conclude that the 
investigation arose from Simko’s November 2014 letter to the 
EEOC.80 However, based on our precedent and the actual 
workings of EEOC investigations, that is a distinction without 
difference. I have already explained that EEOC investigators 
are instructed to look for retaliation in their investigations of 
substantive discrimination claims and also explained why that 
is so very reasonable. Communication with the petitioner 
during the course of the investigation is a routine and necessary 
part of such investigations. In fact, we held that the EEOC 
erred when it failed to communicate with the petitioner during 
the investigation in Hicks.81 We concluded that had the 
investigation been reasonable and proper, the EEOC would 
have communicated with Hicks, and that it was likely that 
communication would have put the EEOC on notice of his 
additional claim of sex discrimination.82 That is exactly what 
occurred here.   
 
During the course of the EEOC’s investigation of the 
discrimination claim, Simko put the EEOC on notice of an 
additional claim of retaliation that arose after he filed, and as a 
 
78 Nor, however, are all of these additional factors necessarily 
required. As we held in rejecting the per se rule in Robinson, 
we must “examine carefully the prior pending EEOC 
complaint and the unexhausted claim on a case-by-case basis” 
to determine whether the unexhausted claim is reasonably 
within the scope of the prior complaint. 107 F.3d at 1024. 
79 Maj. Op. at 21. 
80 Id. 




result of, his initial claim. Such communication is not only 
contemplated by our caselaw; it is encouraged by it and it is 
required by the EEOC’s guidance. Thus, I fail to see how it 
was unreasonable for the EEOC to inquire into any acts of 
retaliation. Indeed, the EEOC would have been derelict if it had 
not done so. The very fact that the investigation arose from 
Simko’s November 2014 letter is actually evidence of its 
reasonableness. I do not think we can so easily dismiss the 
EEOC’s assessment of what is a reasonable investigation in 
such cases. 
 
The Majority next takes issue with the length of time 
that the investigation took. And while the EEOC has 
commendably and forthrightly admitted that the prolonged 
delay was a mistake, that should not defeat Simko’s claim; he 
did not cause the delay. I do not dispute my colleagues’ claim 
that the length of time that the investigation took is out of the 
ordinary.83 However, there is nothing in the statute or 
precedent that allows us to find that unreasonably delaying an 
investigation is sufficient to overturn our presumption that the 
investigation that was conducted was reasonable. In fact, if 
anything, our caselaw points to the opposite conclusion. We 
have consistently maintained that where the EEOC errs, we do 
not to allow the errors to adversely impact a claim. For 
example, in Hicks we noted, “[t]he failure of the EEOC to 
accept [an] amendment is . . . [a] failure of the agency to follow 
the statute and its own regulations,” but we concluded that 
“[t]he individual employee should not be penalized by the 
improper conduct of the Commission.”84 I cannot understand 
why we now penalize Simko for the agency’s laxity.  
 
And we have concluded that much more egregious 
failures by the EEOC than simple delay do not preclude a 
petitioner’s suit. For example, “failure of the EEOC to give 
notice of a charge to the employer involved or its failure to 
attempt reconciliation, both of which are required by section 
706(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(b), does not bar a civil 
 
83 See Maj. Op. at 24 n.12. 
84 Hicks, 572 F.2d at 964–65. See also id. at 966 (“We reject 
such a limitation . . . [that would] ask[] the court to penalize a 
plaintiff for the possible misconduct of the EEOC.”). 
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suit by the charging party.”85 This is because an “individual’s 
right to bring a civil action . . . should not be defeated by the 
EEOC’s failure to comply with its statutory obligations.”86 Our 
holding today is to the contrary.87 
 
Finally, the Majority is concerned that failing to dismiss 
Simko’s claim could encourage gamesmanship in the claim 
filing process by allowing a claimant to “greatly expand an 
investigation simply by alleging new and different facts when 
he was contacted by the [EEOC] following his charge.”88 But 
that alleged risk is not at issue here. An individual who alleges 
retaliation for the filing of a previous charge is not “gaming the 
system,” because s/he is not complaining of discriminatory 
conduct that arose before the initial claim of discrimination. 
The retaliation must necessarily come after the charge is filed. 
Here, in the face of new alleged acts of discrimination, Simko 
appropriately “include[ed] [in his charge] new acts which 





In sum, I believe that our precedent requires the 
conclusion that it was quite reasonable for the EEOC, during 
the course of its investigation of Simko’s claim of disability 
discrimination, after being alerted by Simko about retaliation 
for the filing of the initial charge, to also investigate the alleged 
retaliation. That conclusion is reinforced here where the EEOC 
guidance tells us that such retaliation investigations are routine, 
and where the EEOC actually investigated the discrimination, 
concluded that there was evidence of retaliation, and attempted 
 
85 Id. at 964 (emphasis added). 
86 Id. 
87 The Majority recognizes that it is “unfortunate” that “the 
EEOC did not promptly react to his November 2014 
correspondence,” Maj. Op. at 36, but then proceeds to do 
what our caselaw warns against and punishes Simko for the 
EEOC’s failure. 
88 Maj. Op. at 23 (quoting Hicks, 572 F.2d at 967.). 
89 Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 399. 
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to conciliate the dispute. Accordingly, I must respectfully 
dissent from my colleagues’ analysis. 
